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INTRODUCTION 
Game theory, mathematical programming, and control theory are rapidly 
increasing their intersection. The present paper is just in the middle of the 
intersection. This work has its motivation and background from the theory 
of differential games which was initiated by the American mathematician 
Rufus Isaacs some 15 years ago. The designation of the game is originated 
from Bellman’s “multistage games.” 
Many of the fundamental results in differential games are obtained rigor- 
ously by Pontryagin [l] and Berkovitz [2, 31. Principally, we will follow [2] 
and [3] in formulation of the game. For more details, reference may be 
made to these works. Nevertheless, in this paper, the fundamental tool for 
the derivations of necessary conditions for optimal strategies is the Kuhn- 
Tucker conditions in nonlinear programming, because of the intrinsic 
structures of the multistage games. This game has inherently discrete 
structures as the name indicates. 
The applicability of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem is guaranteed by so called 
the constraint qualification. We will give a sufficient condition for the 
fulfilment of this condition, in the third part of the paper. In the last section, 
we will obtain necessary conditions for optimal pure strategies that are our 
main concern here. Throughout the discussion, the Kuhn-Tucker theorem 
turns out to have an attracting effectiveness. 
1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
We are going to deal with one of games of degree [4] and of two-person 
zero-sum with perfect information. The game has finite number of stages 
at which it is played. Both players have their states and strategic variables. 
The one player wishes to minimize value of a certain function selecting a 
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finite number of strategies, while the other player wants to maximize the 
value of the same function. At each stage of the game, states and strategic 
variables are related to their adjoining stage in a certain uniformity; that is 
the game has its inherent logical structure which is lacking in games of chess 
type. The game is played in real Euclidean space. 
Let 9 be an n -: m dimensional real Euclidean space. Let V be a bounded 
region of 9. Let cFz and gY be Euclidean T- and s-space respectively. Define 
a direct product 
Let (xk , yk), xk = (xkl, xi2 ,..,, .xLn), yk .: (ykl, yk2 ,..., ykm), be an element 
of V, where k is an element of N 7 1 ordered natural numbers: 
k E X = (0, 1, 2 ,..., N}. 
We call k the stage number of the game, and V the playing space. Let fk be a 
C2) mapping of & into Fp for k E X’ = (0, 1, 2,..., N - 1). Let g, be a Cf2) 
mapping of d into V for k E X’. The game is governed by the recurrence 
equations: 
X :+, = fk+k ,ylc , uk 9 zk), i = 1, 2 ,..., n, kEX’ (l-1) 
Y:+l = dxk > yk ) uk 9 zkh j= I,2 ,***, m, KEX’, (1.2) 
where x,,( and yOj are given. We call the vector xk , having n elements, the 
state of player A at kth stage and yk , having m elements, the state of player B 
at kth stage. Vectors uA E gz and zk E 8” are called strategic variables. We will 
call the vector valued functions 
@$ , yk) = (“kl(xk 3 Yk), uk2(xk I yk),-*, #k+k Y yk)h kEX’ 
and 
zk@k , yk) = bk’txk , yk), zk2(xk , Yk),-, zka(xk 9 Ykb kEX’ 
the pure strategies of player A and B, respectively. 
In order to avoid complication in notations we will not distinguish nota- 
tions of vectors and matrices from their transpose. Scalar products of vectors 
and multiplications of matrices will not be denoted any symbols. Positivity 
of a vector is defined as the positivity of each component. Subscripts represent 
the stage number and superscripts are used for the components of each 
vector. Upper case letters without subscripts and superscripts express a 
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composite vector in which all the possible value taken place in the game, are 
entried. Therefore, if we write X this means that 
x = (x(+, x02 ).,.) x0”, x*1, x12 ,...) xln ,...) XNl, XN2 ,..., xNy, 
i.e., X is a composite (IV $ 1) n-vector. We will use a similar notations for 
other variables. A sequence {zI;} and a vector Z will be used in the same 
meaning. That is, if k = 0, 1,2 ,..., I U - 1, then 2 is an sN-vector. Choice 
will be made depending on each case. We will note that .xk and yk are defined 
for k E Y but uk and zk are defined for k E .%?’ because of the recurrence 
equations (1.1) and (1.2). 
Let us denote the game in question by T(k; xk , yk). The play begins at 
certain initial state (x,, , ys) in V and terminates at Nth stage in V. We will 
assume N is finite. Let .F(xN , yN) be an differentiable manifold which is a 
part of the boundary of @, where g is the closure of %. When a pair of states 
(xb, yk) reaches F(xN, yN), the game is over. We will call .F(x,,, , yN) the 
terminal surface. Let G,(x, , yN) be a real-valued function of class Ct2) 
defined on F. G, will be called the terminal payoff function. Let 
Fk(xI( , yk , I(~ , zk) be a real-valued function of class Cf2) defined on d 
and let G, be the terminal payoff function. Then for each pure strategies 
{uL(xL ,yk)} and (zJx~ , ylc)} the payoff can be expressed in the form 
N-l 
P(k; $, , Y,J , x, y , u, 2) = G&j,’ , YN) + c Fk(%c 3 Yk 3 l(k 3 zk)- 
k-0 
Player A wishes to maximize the payoff P by selecting strategies (#k(xk ,yk)) 
and player B chooses {z&k , yk)} so as to minimize P over the set r. 
Let Rk be a Fe) mapping of % x &z into Euclidean p-space and SI, be a Ct”) 
mapping of %’ x 8; into q-space. R, will restrict the selection of strategic 
variable i(k at kth stage in the systems of inequalities of the form 
R,‘(x, ,Yk 9 uk) < 0, i E 9 = (1, 2 ,..., p}, kEX (l-3) 
and Sk will constrain the choice of zk at kth stage: 
sk’(xk , yk 9 zk) > 0, jE.9 = {1,2 ,..., q}, KEX’. (1.4) 
We will call these C’t2) manifolds constructed by (1.3) and (1.4) the constraint 
sets. It may be happened that some of the components of Rk vanish, i.e., a 
pair (x, , yk , +) becomes on the boundary of the constraint set, but other 
components do not. That is 
Rki(% > yk , uk) = 0, i E Z = {il , 4 ,..., i,} 
&‘h v yk , uk) < 0, jE.P={j:jEgP,j$Z}, kEX 
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and 
&Y% > Yk 7 .%I = 0, iEA = (il, iz ,*.., i } 
&cyx, , y/c , +J > 0, jE3={j:jEL&j$P}, kE3?-‘. 
We assume that u < Y and p < s. We also assume that constraint sets are 
nonempty for all k E .X’. Let %!k denote the class of functions uk(xk , yle) 
that are C’(l) in xk and yk for k E A?, and satisfying (1. l), (1.2), and (1.3) for 
all (xIc, y,J E 9?. Let .%h be the class of functions sR(xk, yk) that are C(1) 
in xTc and yk satisfying (l.l), (1.2), and (1.4) for all (xk , y/J E %. We will call 
these strategies u&x, , yk) and slc(xA ,ylc) that belong to the classes @!k and 
8, , the permissible strategies. We shall say that permissible strategies 
M% 9 Ylc)) are Pl Y bl a a e with respect to the game F(k; xk , ylc) if any pair 
of states, starting at (x0, y,,) in %, can be reached 5(xN, yN) by the use of 
(ulc(xk ,yk)) in finite stages. Playability of {zk(xlc ,yk)} can be defined in a 
similar manner. It may happen that {uk(xk ,yk)) are playable while {zk(xk ,yk)} 
are not playable. Of course in that occasion player A wins the game. 
Let a pair of strategies {ulc(xk , y3} and {alc(xI, , yl,)} be playable and 
P(k; Xo7Y0, X, Y, U, Z) be the value of the payoff function resulting from 
pair. If for some function V(X, Y, U, Z) the relation 
W; x0 9 Yo 7 X, Y, U, Z”) < V(X, Y, U*, Z*) < P(k; xc,, yo , X, Y, U*, Z) 
holds for all possible (xk: , yk) E V; then the value V(X, Y, U*, Z*) will 
be called the value of the game P(k; xlc , ylc), and the pair (U*, Z*) will be 
called a saddle point. We call {@(xk, yk)} and {z$(xR, yk)} optimal pure 
strategies. The sequence of functions {(a$, y$)} resulting from ((~2, zf)} 
will be called the optimal path and we will denote it by K*(X, Y). Now we 
can state the problem. 
PROBLEM 1. Maximize the function P(k; x0 , y. , X, Y, U, Z) by selecting 
the sequence of the vector-valued functions {ulc(xb , yk)} according to the recur- 
rence equations (1.1) and (1.2), and subject to the constraints (1.3). While 
minimize the function P by choosing the sequence of vector-valued functions 
(x,(x, , ylc)} according to (1.1) and (1.2), and subject to the constraints (1.4). 
2. THE KUHN-TUCKER CONDITIONS 
Before we obtain some of necessary conditions for optimal strategies, we 
will summarize the Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions that play a key role in 
subsequent discussion. Dimension of spaces is defined for the convinience of 
later sections. 
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Problem considered in [a is as follows: 
Let &‘i be an Euclidean n(N + 1) L m(IK + 1) + sN-space, 8.. an 
&!-space and 6s an q-y-space. Let T, : 8i -+ Ei , T, : 8i --t 8s and 
T, : &i -+ R, he C’s) mappings. Let P(q) b e a real-valued function of class 
Ct2) on c” “1 * 
PROBLEM 2. Find a sector q* that minimizes P(T) constrained by 
T*(7) = 0, T2(7) = 0 and T3(7) 3 0. 
I,EMMA 1 (Kuhn- Tucker). Dejine the Lagrangian 
@(7, A, $9 II) = p(7) -1. hT,(7) + #T2(7) + pT3(7), 
where 
hE4, *e&Y p E 8,. 
Assume that the constraint qualification is satisfied. [5] Then in order that 7* 
be a solution of Problem 2, it is necessary that 7* and X*, 1/1*, p-I* satisfy the 
following conditions : 
CD,* = 0, where 0,” --_ g evaluated at * 7 , (2-l) 
@\* = 0 @"=O, (2.2) 
@,* y* = 0, @>O, p* =o. (2.3) 
Proof will be found in [5]. Relations (2.3) constitute so called the comple- 
mentary slackness conditions. Note that @: E 8, , @: ~8~ , 0: E g2, and 
q,f&. 
3. THE CONSTRAINT QUALIFICATION 
In order to rule out singularity, we must restrict the constraint qualification 
on the game. Since definition I below is less practical, we will give more 
practical condition for the constraint qualification. Nevertheless, still the 
fulfilment of the condition can not be known a priori. A simple example in 
which the constraint qualification fails to hold, is found in [5]. This restriction 
also rules out the singular solutions for optimal strategies. 
Define 
O~~=((~k,~lr,~lk):fk-xk+l=O,gk-~k+l=O,Rk~O;k~~} (3.1) 
0, - {(xp , yk , zk) : fk - x~+~ = O,g, - ylicl = 0, Sk 2 0; k E X’> (3.2) 
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Rk = (R;, Ri,l ,.a., Rt). i, e 2, kcX (3 3) 
R, = (R;, R? ,..., R~-o), i,, E g, kEX’ (3.4) 
Sk = (S$ q )..., q,, i,n E 4 kEX (35) 
Sk = (Sj,’ , q,..., Q-q, j, E 2, KEX’, (3.6) 
where Z,8, A, and $ are defined in Section 1. Let (xc , y:) be one part of 
an optimal path K*(X, Y), and let zz(xlc, yk) be an optimal pure strategy 
at kth stage for player B. Suppose at kth stage, the pair ($ , y$ , zz) is a 
boundary point of the manifold 
(txk , yk , zk) : sk’(xk , Yk , zk) 2 0, j E % 
Then p components of Sk vanish. Therefore, since p < s, there can be defined 
p independent components of strategic variables zkj, j = 1,2,..., p, at kth 
stage of the game. Denote this vector by ,%k . 
DEFINITION 1. At kth stage of the game F(k; xk , yk) let fo~owing 
conditions hold: 
af: ax, (xk - .%:) > 0, $ (xk - x:) > 0, (3.7) 
$$ (yk - y:) 3 0, $ (yk - J’:) >, 0, !$ (yk - y:) >/ 0, (3.8) 
g (a, - 5:) > 0. (3.9) 
Here, * means the evaluation along an optimal path. Then, the constraint 
qualification with respect to player B at kth stage is said to be satisfied, if 
there exists a Co) mapping 
w : [O, l] + 0, . 
That is, there exists qIk = w(e), B E [0, 11, such that w(O) = 7: and 
8(O) = /I(71k - 7fk) for some positive number 8, where 
?lk = cxk ,Yk 9 zk) and $k = (4, Yk* 8 m. 
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LEMMA 2. The constraint qualification with respect to player B at kth 
stage, is satis$ed if 
rank 
af;,* af: afit. --- 
ax, aYk azk 
ad ad ad 
ax, 
-- 
aYk azk 
aS,* as: aS,* --- 
axk 9, azk 
=n+m+p. (3.10) 
PROOF. Let us define a subset of c&: 
4 = {+ : &@k,yk, zk) = 0, fk - %+l = 0, gk - yk+l = o,i Es). 
Define a mapping 17 : V x C$ + En+m+~ by 
(3.11) 
Then 
(3.12) 
is an (n + m + p) x (n + m + p) matrix. Hence det(17zI) is different from 
zero iff the matrix lI& has rank n + m + p. Now let us consider a relation 
of a real positive number o! and the value jjlK of r]rk for which 
Wlk> = 17(11.a + oJ7,*1k(%k - da (3.13) 
holds. We can see that the function (3.13) is continuous for OL in a neighbor- 
hood of zero in El and for vrk in a neighborhood of & in En+m+~. Moreover, 
this function is differentiable with respect to qrk because of the P property 
that we have assumed. Hence, from the implicit function theorem, there exist 
1 We are tacitly assuming that uI E +Yk is fixed (see Section 4). 
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a neighborhood Jv;(O) in El and a neighborhood Jr/-,(&) in En++p such that, 
for every 01 in Jr(O), there is a unique relation 
iilk = Q(a) (3.14) 
in .AQ&) for which 
dc = Q(O) (3.15) 
holds. Now, differentiate (3.13) with respect to 01 and let 01 = 0 to have 
(3.16) 
Thus from the property of the matrix l7& we can conclude that 
40) = tflk - 4s 
iff the assertion of Lemma 2 holds. We want to show that 
(3.17) 
-w E OSK for a 20% @ E 4(O), (3.18) 
where BS, is defined by (3.2). From the definition of n(~&) and from (3.7), 
(3.8), (3.9), (3.13) we have 
for 01 2 0, a E N,(O). (3.19) 
It follows from (3.19) and (3.14) that 
qJ(4 > 0 for 01 > 0, a E JqO). 
Furthermore 
Sk(%k) = Sk(QW) for a 2 0, a E 4(O). 
Let us define the function w(0)-and prove that the desired conditions hold. 
Let 01 be a small number such that 
o<a<18, j3 >o. 
Define 
44 = Q(/w for 8 E [O, 11. 
Then we notice that 
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and that 
40) = r@(O) =fwjlk - 7:). 
Moreover we can see that 
44 f 0, 9 0 E LO, 11 Q.E.D. 
In a similar manner the constraint qualification with respect to player A 
can be defined. We will give Lemma 3 without proof. 
LEMMA 3. The constraint qualz~cation with respect to player A at kth 
stage, is satisjed if 
=n+m+o. (3.20) 
Note that Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 are sufficient but not necessary. 
4. NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR OPTIMAL PURE STRATEGIES 
The following assumptions are essential in our theorem: 
(H,) Optimal strategies {$(xk , yL)} and {z$(xk , ye)} exist and unique. 
(Ha) The game P(k; x, , yk) has a value V(X, Y, U, 2) uniquely. 
(Ha) The matrices defined by (3.10) and (3.20) have rank n + m + p and 
n + m + (T respectively, for all stages of the game. 
(H4) Strategic variables uk and zk appear linearly in not all the equations 
of the game for all k e ~6’. 
THEOREM 1. Let (Hi) to (HJ hold. Let K*(X, Y) be an optimal path 
resulting from {u$} and (x$}, starting at (x0, yo) in V and terminating at 
(xN , yN) in @. Then for all k E ~67 there etit unique vectors h, E En, t,bk E En”, 
vk E ED and px E Eq, such that along K*(X, Y) the following hold: 
+ & bdk) + & bkSk) (4.la) 
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a 
h-1 = g$ -t & (VkRk) + - (PkJlk) 
3Yk 
aGN 
AN-1 = ar, 
“N 
1/I&l = 2 , 
aHk 
au, + -& (VkRk) = 0 
k 
(4.lb) 
(4.2a) 
(4.2b) 
(4.3a) 
(4.3b) 
aHk 
%+1 = ahl, 9 
aHk 
Yk+l = w 9 
vk”Rki(xk , yk , uk) = 0, 
pk’sk+k , yk , zk) = 0, 
Rk”@k , yk , uk) < 0, 
Sk+, 9 yk , xk) 2 0, 
vki < 0, 
pk’ < 0, 
(4.4a) 
(4.4b) 
(4.5a) 
(4.5b) 
(4.6a) 
(4.6b) 
(4.7a) 
(4.7b) 
REMARK. Conditions (4.5a), (4.6a), and (4.7a) constitute the comple- 
mentary slackness condition in the sense that at kth stage, for some vki and 
Rki, it is allowed either vkl = 0, Rki < 0 or vki < 0, Rkt = 0, but not vk’ = 0, 
Rd = 0 simultaneously so that (4.5a) holds. 
PROOF. The proof will be established along Lemma 1. Define 
I = (X9 y, q, 6 = (X y, w, 
7]k = bk Y Yk > Ik), ‘tk = bk 9 Yk 3 uk)s KEY’. 
Let us interpret the game in question as two extremization problems dis- 
cussed in Section 2. First, the recurrence equations (1.1) and (1.2) can be 
expressed in systems of C(s) mapping: 
Tl(@) = 0, T,(8) = 0. 
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That is 
T,(0) = (fo - Xl ,.fl - x2 ,...,fiv-1 - XN), 
T,(O) = (go -Yl~gl - Y2 P.,LTN-1 -YAJ, (4-g) 
where we have set 
0 = (X, Y, u, 2). 
The constraints (1.3) and (1.4) have the form 
T*(t) < 0, T,(T) 2 09 
I.e., 
T&3 = iR, , 4 ,..., %A 
7’2(d = (St, , S, >.a., S,-1). 
The payoff can be written as 
(4.9) 
P(X, Y, u, 2) = P( 0) = P( u, r]) = P( .f, Z). (4.10) 
In order to apply Lemma 1, tirst let {u$) be fixed and let us focus our attention 
on (zk(xk , yJ} and seek for the conditions in which {xL(xk ,yk)} furnishes a 
minimum against {u:} in the class Sk . Define the Lagrangian 
= P(0) + XT,(@) + W,(0) + rT,(rl)- (4.11) 
We have omitted T,(f) because {z$} is fixed, T4([) < 0 has no restriction 
on {a*}. Note that all .the possible values except CfG v,& , that are taken in 
the game are entried in the Lagrangian. Thus for 7 to furnish minimum, it is 
necessary that (2.1) to (2.3) hold. Though (2.2) imply the original recurrence 
equations, from the property of the function Hk we can derive (4.4a) 
and (4.4b). Equations (4.5b), (4.6b), and (4.7b) are direct consequences of 
(2.3). Now let us take up (4.la). The first N equations of (2.1), i.e., 0% = 0, 
turn out to be 
@k - - Xk-1 +$ Vkfk) + & oh&k) + & (PkSk) 
axk k 
aFk at&f 
+ & axk + hk ’ ’ axk - a@ f,~+&(~~k)~+~~ 
a 
+ K (‘kfk) axk a”T+&k($&k)g + & (tcksk) !$ = 0. 
k 
(4.12) 
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Note that U: is a function of xk and yk , and ,z$ is a function of xk and yk . 
We want to show that 
(4.13) 
Let (x: , y$) be one part of K*(X, Y) such that Sk’(xj$ , y$ , z,$) = 0, j E A. 
Since S,j(x, , yR , z$(xk , yk)) 2 0,j E A, in V, we see that S,j has a minimum 
at the interior point (x$ , y$) of V. This brings us the fact that 
as,j as,j --- + 
as: a.$ =. -- 
axk ax, a2tk ax, (4.14) 
holds at kth stage of the game. Henceforth 
Pkj 
aski 
7Jy + ' jE4 kE.X', (4.15) k 
holds for any plcj < 0. Equation (4.15) together with (4.5b) yields (4.13). Thus 
aHk aH, ati,* 
- hk-, + T + - - 
k auk axk 
Postmultiplying (4.3b) by the matrix @/ax, , 
a& aZ,* 
az,ax, +&(pksk)z =O. 
On the other hand, from (4.13) 
Postmultiply (4.3a) by &$/ax, to obtain 
a& ati: au: 
au, ax, + & +kRk) 7 = O* 
k 
By a discussion similar to that of obtaining (4.13), we see that 
(4.16) 
(4.17) 
(4.18) 
(4.19) 
(4.20) 
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Combine (4.17) to (4.20) to have 
aH, all,* - - = & hm au, ax, (4.21) 
aH, a2: - - = 6. (P&)~ az, ax, (4.22) 
Equations (4.21) and (4.22) together with (4.16) yield the desired relation 
(4.la). Relation (4.lb) can be derived in a similar manner. Since G, is a 
function of only xN and yN , the last equation of @: =I 0 is (4.2a). (4.3b) is 
derived from @$ = 0 that are the last N equations of @IT = 0. 
Let us establish the remaining equations. This time fix {zt} and look upon 
{tlk(xk ,n)} as furnishing maximum against {z:} in the class 4Yk . Lemma 1 
can be easily modified for the maximization problem. The Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions yield (4.1), (4.2), (4.3a), (4.4) (4.5a), (4.6a), and (4.7a), except 
that multipliers h, and #t are replaced by 1, and $k. We must show that 
4 = 42 9 #k = fJk for all k fz X’. 
On the terminal surface Y(xN , yN), h,-, and xN are related in the manner 
aGN 
AN-1 = ax 
N 
for the minimization problem, On the other hand for the maximization 
problem 
Thus 
Moreover by (4.la) 
ii,-, = $ . 
N 
h -x N-l - N-l * 
aHN-, 
xN-2 = c + 
Nl 
& (vNelRN-,) i- & (PN-I~N-I) = ‘N-2 * 
Nl 
A simple induction proves the uniqueness of h, , for all k E x’. The unique- 
ness of & is just the same. This completes the proof. 
Although we have deduced necessary conditions for optimal strategies, 
if the strategic variables uK and zk appear linearly in (1. 1), (1.2), (1.3), (1.4) 
as well as payoff function, conditions (4.3a) and (4.3b) do not necessarily 
hold. In order to get over this difficulty we will give other conditions for 
optimal pure strategies. Following theorem is valid for the present case as well 
as for the case discussed heretofore. 
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THEOREM 2. Suppose (H,) to (H3) hold. Then for al2 k E X, there exist 
unique vectors A, , & , vk , and pcLk that are elements of En, E”‘, Eli, and E” 
respectively, such that along K*(X, Y) the conditions (4.1) to (4.7) hold except 
that (4.3) is replaced by 
Hk(x,*, y; I uk 9 $, < Hk(x: 9 y; 3 @, z:,, KEX’. (4.24) 
PROOF. Let (x5 y* hj kYUk! KY kdi%k * x* ** *) be fixed for all k E X. The 
assumptions are that 
qx*, y*, u*, z*> < qx*, y*, u*, 2) (4.25) 
and zk , zk* E Sk, for all k E X’. Since zk and ,z$ are permissible, we know 
that 
%?( fk@k* , yk*, uk*, %?) - %,?+I) = o 
%+( fk@ I y: 9 u$ 9 Ik) - x:+,> = o 
&%?k(xk* > id Y d, zk) - y;+*,,> = 0, for all KG%‘. 
Additions of these terms preserves inequality (4.25): 
Appropriate eliminations term by term shows the desired relation (4.23). 
(4.24) is clear already. Q.E.D. 
REMARK 1. Equations (4.23) and (4.24) state that 
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That is at every stage player A must select his strategy uk(xk , yK) so as to 
maximize the function Hk in order to play best. On the other hand player B 
must choose x,(x, , rk) so as to minimize Hk to play best. 
REMARK 2. So called the singular extremals are ruled out by the assump- 
tion of the constraint qualification. 
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